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1 Introduction
In political circles the argument is sometimes put forth that mergers of domestic firms
have the advantage of creating ‘global players’, i.e. bigger firms that will be in a better
position to compete with foreign firms in world markets. A recent example in Germany
has been the merger between the E.ON and Ruhrgas corporations. The German Federal
Cartel Office rejected the merger in 2002, and this decision was backed by the scientific
Monopoly Commission. Nevertheless, the German Minister of Economics eventually
cleared the merger in 2003, overruling the decision by the cartel authority. A main
reason for the positive decision of the Ministry of Economics was the ‘global player’
argument, which was considered to be very important at the onset of energy market
liberalization in Europe.1
The international competitiveness of domestic firms is an explicit policy objective in
the merger guidelines of several countries, including Canada, France, Sweden and the
U.K (see Ro¨ller, Stennek and Verboven, 2000). According to this policy goal a merger
can serve the national interest by increasing the market share of domestic firms in
world markets. A second possibility for a merger to improve national welfare, at the
expense of foreigners, is that it raises prices for consumers in world markets. Hence,
merger policy may be associated with similar goals as strategic export subsidies or tax
exporting measures (Brander and Spencer, 1985).
The literature on ‘strategic’ merger policies has taken two different routes. A first
set of papers focuses on nationally optimal merger policies and merger profitability
when trade policy instruments are simultaneously available to national governments
(Richardson, 1999; Horn and Levinsohn, 2001; Huck and Konrad, 2004; De Stefano
and Rysman, 2004). A second line of research is based on the concept of the ‘external
effects’ of a merger introduced by Farrell and Shapiro (1990). This concept has been
extended to an open economy setting by Barros and Cabrol (1994) and Head and Ries
(1997), who differentiate between the external effects of the merger on other agents in
the home country (i.e., consumers and firms not participating in the merger), and the
external effects on agents in other countries. This literature has derived rather general
1The importance of the ‘global player’ argument in the context of the E.ON-Ruhrgas merger is
also stressed by Sinn (2002, pp. 10-12.)
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conditions under which a merger benefits, or harms, the parties not participating in
the merger. It does not, however, explicitly consider the (possible) cost reductions
accompanying a merger, and therefore cannot provide a complete characterization of
the post-merger equilibrium.
In this paper we take a different approach by setting up a simple, linear model of
Cournot competition in open economies that incorporates the possible cost reductions
caused by a merger and is able to make comparisons over discrete merger equilibria.
Hence we analyse, in an international setting, the basic trade-off that exists for merger
policy when the merger has anti-competitive effects, but also leads to reduced produc-
tion costs. This trade-off, first analysed by Williamson (1968) for the case of a closed
economy, is often referred to as the ‘efficiency defense’ for a merger. The European
Union’s new merger control guidelines explicitly acknowledge the possibility of such
efficiency gains, and foresee that these enter the Commission’s overall assessment of
any merger proposal (European Union, 2004, C31/13).
A second difference to the existing literature is that we focus on a three-country model
where two competitors in each of two countries serve their respective home markets,
and all firms jointly compete in a third (world) market. This market structure captures
the situation in many network industries, such as electricity, natural gas, telecommu-
nications or railways. A typical example is the electricity market, where the German
duopolists E.ON and RWE compete with other ‘national champions’ in several Euro-
pean markets, including Sweden, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, and the United
Kingdom. It is also relevant in other markets (for cement, dairy products, etc.) where
large national players compete in third markets, but less so in the respective home
markets of their competitors.
In this setting we analyze whether a merger is in the interest of the firms involved,
the home country, and the world as a whole. The simplicity of our model allows us to
explicitly link the producer surplus and welfare effects of a merger to two core parame-
ters, the cost reduction accompanying the merger and the relative size of the home and
the foreign market. Moreover, it is straightforward in our three-country framework to
carry out parallel analyses of national and international mergers, and to compare the
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different effects.2 This comparison reveals that national and international mergers have
rather different implications in our setting. For national mergers, a potential conflict
of interest arises between the merging firms and a national regulator, and the poli-
cies enacted by national merger authorities tend to be overly restrictive from a global
efficiency perspective. In contrast, all international mergers that benefit the merging
firms will be cleared by either a national or a regional regulator, and this laissez-faire
approach is also globally efficient.
In a final step, we analyse whether national mergers, international mergers or no merg-
ers will be the equilibrium market structure, once again relating different regimes to
different combinations of cost savings and relative market size. These features link
our model to the recent literature on cross-border mergers and on endogenous merger
equilibria (Horn and Persson, 2001a,b; Bjorvatn, 2004; Lommerud et al., 2005).
The paper is set up as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic framework of our analysis.
Section 3 analyzes the conditions under which national mergers are in the interest of the
merging firms. Section 4 turns to optimal merger policy from the perspectives of a single
country, and the (model) world as a whole. Section 5 discusses the analogous effects
for an international merger. Section 6 analyses the characteristics of the endogenous
merger equilibrium. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
In this section we set up a simple model which allows us to analyze some of the
dimensions associated with merger policy and the creation of global players. The focus
is on an open economy, called the home country H, where the market for a certain
good is served by two domestic producers. The same two firms also export to a market
abroad, referred to as the world market and indexed W. In the domestic market the
two firms do not face any competition, whereas on the market abroad they compete
with two firms from another country, called the foreign country, F. These two foreign
firms in addition supply the good to their respective domestic market, where again
they are the only suppliers. The model framework is illustrated in Figure 1.
2The strong increase in international mergers since the 1980s is documented in Gugler et al. (2003).
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Figure 1: The three-market model
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The two domestic firms consider merging, and we shall also study the consequences
of merger plans on the part of the two foreign companies. As far as possible we rely
on symmetry in setting up the model. Prior to any merger, all firms have the same
(constant) level of marginal cost; all markets are characterized by Cournot competition;
and the size of the two ‘national’ markets in H and F are equal. The world market W
may be bigger than any of the local markets.
A few remarks on the model are in order. In deciding on the model, our criteria have
been that we wish to study merger policy in an open economy; in particular we wish to
shed some light on the creation of ‘global players’, i.e. firms which besides being large in
the national market are also important players in the world market. So a merger in the
model should have international consequences. At the same time, a merged company
should still be facing competition from other firms; these we have placed in the foreign
country. For symmetry reasons, also the competitors regard the world market as a
market abroad, while at the same time serving their respective own market.3
3As an alternative, we could have set up a two-country model, in which firms in both countries
serve each other’s market. In that model, a symmetric set-up of the two countries would have been
natural. However, that set-up would not correspond well with the image related to creation of global
players in a world market. Hence, we opted for the three-market framework above.
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In line with much of the literature on merger policy we take imperfect competition
to be of the Cournot-Nash type in all markets and the good under consideration to
be homogeneous. Moreover, markets are segmented and firms maximize profits in each
market separately.4
The domestic market is given by the inverted demand schedule5
p = a− b(x1 + x2), a > 1. (1)
The price in the domestic market is labeled p, and the linear demand schedule is
characterized by the intercept a and the slope parameter b. The intercept a measures
the maximum price consumers are willing to pay for the first unit of the good, while
the size of the market is determined primarily by the slope parameter b. The two home
country firms supply x1 and x2, respectively, prior to merger, and they do so facing a
marginal cost of unity (which is why a > 1 must hold in our model). There are no fixed
costs, and the number of domestic firms (two) is held fixed, except for the possibility
of a merger of the two.
Quite conventionally, the maximization of profits in the two duopoly firms results in
quantities supplied of x1 = x2 = (a− 1)/(3b) and a market price of p = (a+ 2)/3, i.e.
(a− 1)/3 above the unitary marginal cost.
The domestic firms are fully owned by residents of the home country whereas the foreign
firms are owned by residents of the foreign country. In the home country, consumer
surplus cs and joint producer surplus of the two firms, ps, each amounts to
cs = ps =
2
b
(
a− 1
3
)2
. (2)
4Again, several alternatives are available, including Bertrand competition (most meaningfully with
differentiated goods) and monopolistic competition. It is well known from the work of Kreps and
Scheinkman (1983), however, that modelling a two-stage game with capacity competition and subse-
quent price competition between firms yields the same results as the simple Cournot model. See also
Hay and Werden (1991) for theoretical and empirical arguments in defense of the Cournot model. At
the same time, in lieu of segmented markets one could have postulated one big integrated market as
in Barros and Cabral (1994) and Head and Ries (1997); yet, that corresponds less well with an image
of global players with a base in their domestic market.
5The demand schedule can be derived in a general equilibrium framework from a quadratic and
quasi-linear utility function.
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Hence, the sum of consumer and producer surpluses, total surplus ts, is twice the
amount in the above formula,
ts =
4
b
(
a− 1
3
)2
. (3)
In line with the ‘efficiency defense’ literature on mergers we adopt total surplus as the
basic welfare measure in our analysis.6
The two home firms both service the market abroad and do so together with the two
firms in the foreign country. There, the inverted demand curve is
P = a−B(X1 +X2 + Y1 + Y2). (4)
Upper-case letters generally refer to the world market (and lower-case letters to the
domestic market). Hence, X1, X2 are the supplies of the two home firms, while Y1, Y2
denote supplies of the two foreign firms. The slope parameter B will in general be
different from the slope parameter b for the market in the home country. A world
market which is bigger than the national market is represented by B < b .
Maximizing profits, all four firms supply the quantity X1 = X2 = Y1 = Y2 = (a −
1)/(5B), yielding a price of P = (a+4)/5, lying (a−1)/5 above unitary marginal cost.
The two domestic firms together harvest a producer surplus of
PS =
2
B
(
a− 1
5
)2
(5)
from the world market. World consumers, on the other hand, register a consumer
surplus of
CS =
1
2B
(
4(a− 1)
5
)2
. (6)
Finally, the domestic market in the foreign country, assumed to be served exclusively
by the two foreign firms, is a complete mirror image of the parallel market in the home
country, so there is no need to go into details.
6The alternative view is that merger control authorities base their decisions solely on the maxi-
mization of consumer surplus. Clougherty (2005) presents some recent evidence that the merger policy
conducted by the United States during the period 1997-2001 was driven primarily by considerations
of consumer welfare, rather than total national surplus. He emphasizes, however, that results may be
different for other countries, in particular for small open economies.
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3 National mergers: the firm perspective
In this section we consider the incentives for the two domestic firms to merge and
become one firm in the domestic market as well as in the world market. We thus seek
to identify the situations in which the sum of producer surpluses on the part of the two
firms from both the domestic and world markets stands to increase following a merger.
If the two firms merge we postulate, in line with the discussion of several of the motives
for mergers in practice,7 that the merged firm realizes a reduction of marginal cost of
∆ ≥ 0, so that it falls to 1 −∆. As a special case, there may be no cost reduction at
all, ∆ = 0, but we shall generally allow for a lowering of marginal cost (and conversely
ignore any possibility of a cost increase). On many occasions below, the size of the cost
reduction will determine whether a merger will be in the interest of the firms involved
or other parties affected by the merger.
A merger of the two domestic firms results in a monopoly in the domestic market. In
consequence, profit maximization will result in a quantity of xM = [(a− 1) + ∆]/(2b)
and a market price of pM = [(a+1)−∆]/2, i.e. [(a−1)+∆]/2 above the new marginal
cost of (1−∆). The superscript ‘M’ stands for merger of home firms, where needed.
On account of monopoly, consumer surplus in the domestic market has been altered to
csM =
1
2b
(
a− 1 + ∆
2
)2
, (7)
while producer surplus is twice this, or
psM =
1
b
(
a− 1 + ∆
2
)2
. (8)
Compared with the previous duopoly situation, as long as the cost reduction is non-
negative, the move to monopoly will for sure increase producer surplus.
We next turn to the consequence of the domestic merger for the world market. For
later use we distinguish between two cases: In the first, no merger has taken place
between the foreign firms; in the second, there already has been a merger between the
two foreign firms.
7Ro¨ller et al. (2000, pp. 12-13) distinguish between rationalization, economies of scale, technological
progress, purchasing economies, and reduction of slack as the possible sources of efficiency gains
following a merger. They observe that savings in variable costs may come in all five forms.
7
Case 1: No foreign merger
At the same time as the merged firm becomes a monopoly in the national market, it
will be one of three suppliers on the market abroad. Profit maximization implies sales
of the monopolist and its foreign competitors to the world market equal to XM =
[a − 1 + 3∆]/(4B), respectively Y M1 = Y M2 = [a − 1 − ∆]/(4B). The price resulting
from these quantities is PM = [a+3−∆]/4, resulting in producer surplus on the part
of the home merged firm of
PSM =
1
B
(
a− 1 + 3∆
4
)2
. (9)
This compares with joint producer surplus of the two foreign firms of
PSMN =
2
B
(
a− 1−∆
4
)2
, (10)
where a subscript ‘N’ is here used to distinguish non-merged (foreign) firms.
Comparing (9) with (5) we can find the condition under which the merged firms’
profits in the world market rise as a consequence of the merger. This is ∆ > (a −
1)(
√
1.28−1)/3 ≈ (a−1)0.044. This can be compared with the condition under which
the market share of the merged firm (XM) will exceed the market share of the two
foreign firms (Y M1 + Y
M
2 ). This latter condition is seen to be ∆ > (a − 1)/5 and thus
requires a substantially higher cost reduction following the merger.8 The reason for this
difference is that the consumer price will increase in the world market, following the
reduction in the number of firms from four to three.
Adding producer surpluses in the two markets, the sum becomes
psM + PSM =
1
b
(
a− 1 + ∆
2
)2
+
1
B
(
a− 1 + 3∆
4
)2
post-merger, compared to pre-merger producer surpluses of
ps+ PS =
2
b
(
a− 1
3
)2
+
2
B
(
a− 1
5
)2
.
A merger will only be in the two home firms’ interest, if the former sum exceeds the
latter. The criterion for this can be written
Γ ≡ (a−1)2
[
1
b
(
1
4
− 2
9
)
+
1
B
(
1
16
− 2
25
)]
+∆(a−1)
[
1
2b
+
3
8B
]
+∆2
[
1
4b
+
9
16B
]
> 0.
(11)
8The flip side to this is that the market share of the foreign firms will rise when ∆ < (a− 1)/5.
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The formula comprises the gains and losses from merging. First, there is a gain from
greater monopoly power and concentration in the domestic market (the first part of
the first term). Second, at unchanged costs, there is a loss of market share in the world
market (the second part of the first term). Third, whatever cost reduction may ensue
from the merger obviously benefits the merged firm in both markets (the second and
third terms).
Without any drop in marginal cost, only the former two effects matter. It is easily seen
that the condition for a merger to be profitable for the merging firms then is B/b > 0.63.
In other words, the world market should not be much larger than the domestic market,
if the net gain from the merger absent cost reduction is to be positive. A natural
benchmark for the size of the world market, given the presence of four firms there
initially against only two in each national market, might be that it is twice as large as
any national market in the sense that B = b/2. In our model, this relative size of the
world market is not compatible with a net gain from merging in the case where the
merger does not result in any lowering of marginal cost.
Underlying these results is the well-known feature that the assumptions of Cournot
competition in all markets and a homogeneous good are not very ‘friendly’ towards
merger. Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) have shown that in the absence of any
cost reductions, aggregate profits of the merging firms will fall, unless the post-merger
market share of these firms is at least 80% in the case of linear demands. In our model
this condition for the merger to be profitable is met in the domestic market, but not
in the world market.9
Incorporating the possibility of a reduction of marginal cost in the merged firm, the
condition on the size of cost reduction for the two home firms to willingly merge is
∆ > ∆˜ ≡ (a− 1)4R + 3
4R + 9
[√
(63− 100R)(4R + 9)/225 + (4R + 3)2
(4R + 3)2
− 1
]
(12)
where we have used R ≡ B/b to measure the size of the home market relative to the
9Results are different under Bertrand competition and heterogeneous goods, where mergers increase
profits under rather general conditions (Deneckere and Davidson, 1985). The likelihood for mergers to
increase profits is also raised under Cournot competition when product heterogeneity is accounted for
(Lommerud and Sørgard, 1997). For a recent summary of arguments why mergers can be profitable
for the merging firms, even in a Cournot framework, see Huck, Konrad and Mueller (2005).
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world market. The larger is the relative size of the world market, i.e. the lower is R,
the higher is the minimal cost reduction ∆˜ required to make the merger profitable. In
the complete absence of a world market (R → ∞), l’ Hoˆpital’s rule gives a ∆˜ < 0. In
the other limiting case of an arbitrarily large world market (R → 0), the critical cost
reduction reaches an upper bound. Setting R = 0 in (12) yields ∆˜ = (a− 1) (√1.28−
1)/3 ≈ (a− 1)0.044. This is just the condition for the merged firm’s profits to increase
in the world market. We sum up our findings in
Result 1. (Domestic merger only.) A merger between the two home firms will increase
their producer surplus, provided (12) holds. The larger is the world market, relative to
the home market, the higher is the cost reduction needed for the merger to be profitable.
Case 2: Foreign firms have merged
For future use we quickly go through the same steps as above on the assumption that
the two foreign competitors have already merged. On account of symmetry in the
model we then know that the cost reduction enabled by a merger and thus enjoyed by
the foreign companies must fulfill the requirement in (12) above. Given this, will the
domestic firms have an incentive to merge, too?
If they merge, the home market moves from duopoly to monopoly, just as above. In the
world market, rather than having two home firms and a merged foreign firm, a duopoly
between a merged foreign firm and a merged home firm ensues. Maximizing profits,
and denoting by ‘MM’ the situation of double merger, they sell XMM = Y MM =
[a− 1 +∆]/(3B) at a price of PMM = [a+ 2− 2∆]/(3), which is (a− 1 +∆)/3 above
the new marginal cost of 1−∆ of both merged firms. From this, the home merged firm
realizes a producer surplus of
PSMM =
1
B
(
a− 1 + ∆
3
)2
. (13)
The two home firms will have an incentive to merge, provided the sum of producer
surpluses in (8) and (13) dominates the sum of producer surpluses in (2) and (10). Is
this the case for cost reductions greater than ∆˜ in (12)?
The answer to this question turns out to be affirmative. The argument proceeds in
three steps. (i) From the symmetry of our set-up and the fact that the foreign firms
10
Table 1: Producer surplus in different merger scenarios
Foreign
Home N M
N 2
b
(
a−1
3
)2
+ 2
B
(
a−1
5
)2 2
b
(
a−1
3
)2
+ 2
B
(
a−1−∆
4
)2
2
b
(
a−1
3
)2
+ 2
B
(
a−1
5
)2 1
b
(
a−1+∆
2
)2
+ 1
B
(
a−1+3∆
4
)2
M 1
b
(
a−1+∆
2
)2
+ 1
B
(
a−1+3∆
4
)2 1
b
(
a−1+∆
2
)2
+ 1
B
(
a−1+∆
3
)2
2
b
(
a−1
3
)2
+ 2
B
(
a−1−∆
4
)2 1
b
(
a−1+∆
2
)2
+ 1
B
(
a−1+∆
3
)2
have merged, we can infer that the net advantage from this first merger, (psM+PSM)−
(ps+PS) [see the formulas (8), (9), (2) and (5)] is non-negative. Further, it obviously
increases in ∆, and the relevant value of ∆ having led to the first merger must therefore
be at least as large as ∆˜. (ii) The net advantage of the second, home firm merger can
be written as (psM + PSMM) − (ps + PSMN ) [using formulas (13) and (10)]. This net
advantage is also increasing in ∆. (iii) The difference between the two net advantage
expressions, equal to (PSMM −PSMN )− (PSM −PS), is easily seen to be greater than
zero for ∆ < (a − 1)/5, which itself is greater than ∆˜. All in all, if the net advantage
from the first merger is positive, so is the net advantage from the second. Thus, if
foreign firms have merged, so will the domestic ones.
Result 2. (Domestic merger, given foreign merger.) If foreign companies have already
merged, so will the domestic firms.
Conditional merger equilibria
The relevant producer surpluses for the home firms, respectively the foreign firms, are
summed up in Table 1 for the two situations of non-merger (N) and merger (M). In
each cell, the upper line gives the producer surplus in the home country while the lower
line describes producer surplus in the foreign country.
On the basis of Results 1 and 2 we can now conclude that the game between the group
of home firms and the group of foreign firms has two possible merger equilibria, when
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only national mergers are considered.10 One equilibrium, the no-merger situation (N,N),
is the outcome for cost reductions ∆ < ∆˜, while the other, ‘twin-merger’, equilibrium
(M,M) emerges for ∆ > ∆˜.
Why is it that the asymmetric situation of (M,N) or (N,M), where one group of firms
merges and the other group does not, will not appear as a Nash-equilibrium? The
answer is that for a group of firms it is more attractive to move from a three-firm
situation in the world market to duopoly there than from a four-firm situation to the
three-firm situation. In both cases, the loss of market share (absent any cost reduction)
is one sixth, but the increase in market concentration delivers a bigger push to the world
market price, when the number of firms there goes from three to two as compared to
from four to three.
Result 3. (National merger equilibria.) For cost reductions lower than ∆˜ in (12), the
Nash equilibrium will entail home and foreign firms abstaining from merging. For cost
reductions in excess of ∆˜, the Nash merger equilibrium will imply both groups of firms
merging. Asymmetric merger equilibria do not occur in our set-up.
4 Optimal policy towards national mergers
4.1 Nationally optimal merger policy
In this section we analyse the conditions under which a national merger will raise
total surplus in the home country, and will therefore be accepted by national merger
control authorities. By adding the producer and consumer surplus measures derived
in the previous sections, we can derive total surplus for the home and foreign country,
respectively, and for each of the different merger scenarios.11 This is given in Table 2.
As a preliminary step, we determine the condition for a merger to be in the interest
of domestic consumers. From the comparison of (2) and (7) consumers stand to gain
10This is why we speak here of ‘conditional’ merger equilibria. The characteristics of the uncondi-
tional merger equilibrium will be discussed in Section 6.
11Note that the change in consumer surplus is independent of whether foreign firms have already
merged or not, since firms in country H do not serve consumers in F and vice versa.
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Table 2: Total surplus in different merger scenarios
Foreign
Home N M
N 4
b
(
a−1
3
)2
+ 2
B
(
a−1
5
)2 4
b
(
a−1
3
)2
+ 2
B
(
a−1−∆
4
)2
4
b
(
a−1
3
)2
+ 2
B
(
a−1
5
)2 3
2b
(
a−1+∆
2
)2
+ 1
B
(
a−1+3∆
4
)2
M 3
2b
(
a−1+∆
2
)2
+ 1
B
(
a−1+3∆
4
)2 3
2b
(
a−1+∆
2
)2
+ 1
B
(
a−1+∆
3
)2
4
b
(
a−1
3
)2
+ 2
B
(
a−1−∆
4
)2 3
2b
(
a−1+∆
2
)2
+ 1
B
(
a−1+∆
3
)2
from the merger if
Θ ≡ csM − cs = 1
2b
[
∆2
4
+
∆(a− 1)
2
− 7(a− 1)
2
36
]
> 0 ⇔ ∆ > ∆C = (a− 1)
3
.
(14)
Hence, consumer surplus will go down, unless it is accompanied by a cost reduction
that is substantially higher than the one needed for the merger to increase producer
surplus, even if the world market is large (cf. Result 1). In our model this characterizes
the ‘rather impressive synergies’ (Farrell and Shapiro, 1990, 114) that are needed for a
merger to reduce consumer prices.12
Now let ∆∗ be the critical cost reduction beyond which total domestic surplus increases
following a merger and recall that R = B/b measures the size of the home market
relative to the world market. In the appendix we derive ∆∗ as a function of R = B/b:
∆∗ = (a− 1)6R + 3
6R + 9
[√
(6R + 9)(250R + 63)/225 + (6R + 3)2
(6R + 3)2
− 1
]
. (15)
It is immediately seen that the merger must always be accompanied by a cost reduction,
if it is to increase total domestic surplus. If the foreign market is infinitely large (R = 0),
then (15) reduces to ∆∗ = (a − 1)(√1.28 − 1)/3 = ∆˜. In this case the home market
does not matter, so the conditions for increasing producer surplus and total national
surplus are identical. In the opposite polar case where only the home market matters
(R → ∞), the critical value ∆∗ reaches its maximum of ∆∗|R→∞ ≈ (a − 1) 0.089.
12Strictly speaking, if in our simple model a ≥ 4, a rise in consumer surplus is completely ruled out,
as ∆ of course cannot exceed one.
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Figure 2: National mergers with national regulation
R =∞ R = 0
∆ = 0
∆ = 0.1(a− 1)
merger proposed
but not permitted
0.63
0.089(a− 1)
0.044(a− 1)
merger proposed and permitted
merger not proposed
Hence, the larger is the home market relative to the world market, the higher is the
critical value of ∆ that is required for an increase in total domestic surplus.
More generally, it is shown in the appendix that the critical cost reduction from a
perspective of national surplus maximization, ∆∗, exceeds the critical cost reduction
from the perspective of the merging firms, ∆˜ [eq. (12)], for any level of R. This result
implies that there is a range of cost reductions ∆∗ > ∆ > ∆˜ for which a merger is
in the private interest of domestic firms, but not in the interest of the home country
as a whole. The reason is the negative ‘external effect’ (in the language of Farrell and
Shapiro, 1990) on domestic consumers. A national merger control authority that is
concerned with maximizing total domestic surplus will reject the merger proposal for
such values of ∆. When the world market is large (R is small), the range of ∆ for
which the merger is blocked becomes smaller, as most of the burden of higher prices
is then borne by consumers in the world market. Figure 2 shows the range of relative
size parameters R and cost savings ∆ for which a merger is privately profitable, and
is either permitted or rejected by a national regulator. The optimal policy towards a
national merger is summarized in
Result 4: (Nationally optimal merger policy.) A national merger authority that max-
imizes total national surplus will accept a proposed merger, if (15) holds. For the range
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Table 3: Consumer surplus in the world market in different merger scenarios
Foreign
Home N M
N 1
2B
(
4(a−1)
5
)2
1
2B
(
3(a−1)+∆
4
)2
M 1
2B
(
3(a−1)+∆
4
)2
1
2B
(
2(a−1)+2∆
3
)2
of cost reductions ∆∗ > ∆ > ∆˜, a merger increases the profits of domestic firms, but
reduces total national surplus.
4.2 Globally optimal merger policy
When deciding on a merger proposal, national governments in our model neglect two
externalities that are caused by the domestic merger: (i) the effect on the producer
surplus earned by foreign firms; and (ii) the effect on consumer surplus in the world
market.13 To complete our analysis of the welfare effects of mergers, Table 3 summarizes
the consumer surplus in the world market in each of the different merger scenarios.
We first consider the case where foreign firms have not merged. The change in foreign
producer surplus caused by a domestic merger is inferred from Table 1. The foreign
firms benefit from the domestic merger if
Φ1 ≡ 2
B
{(
a− 1−∆
4
)2
−
(
a− 1
5
)2}
> 0 ⇔ ∆ < ∆F = (a− 1)
5
. (16)
This is just the condition under which the share of foreign firms in the world market
will rise (see our discussion in Section 3).
From Table 3, the condition for world consumers to benefit from the home merger is
Φ2 ≡ 1
2B
{(
3(a− 1) + ∆
4
)2
−
(
4(a− 1)
5
)2}
> 0 ⇔ ∆ > ∆W = (a− 1)
5
. (17)
Taken together, eqs. (16) and (17) imply that the (external) externalities caused by
a domestic merger are counteracting for any level of ∆, since the turning points for
13Such externalities on foreigners are termed ‘external external effects’ by Barros and Cabral (1994).
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the signs of the individual effects coincide. If the merger causes only a moderate cost
reduction [∆ < (a−1)/5], then the domestic merger will benefit foreign producers, but
hurt consumers in the world market. If, on the other hand, the cost reduction is large
[∆ > (a− 1)/5], then both of these externalities will change sign, and the merger now
hurts foreign producers while benefitting consumers in the world market.
To determine the net externality caused by the domestic merger, we have to add up
Φ1 in (16) and Φ2 in (17). It is shown in the appendix that the joint effect of a
national merger on foreign producers and world consumers is strictly non-negative in
our framework. For ∆ < (a − 1)/5, the positive externality that a domestic merger
causes for foreign producers exceeds the negative effect on world consumers, whereas
for ∆ > (a − 1)/5, the positive externality of a domestic merger on world consumers
exceeds the negative effect on foreign producer surplus.
Defining ∆∗∗ as the critical cost reduction needed to increase global welfare, we get
∆∗∗ = (a− 1) 12R + 5
12R + 23
[√
(12R + 23)(500R + 81)/225 + (12R + 5)2
(12R + 5)2
− 1
]
. (18)
If the world market is negligible (R → ∞), this critical value approaches ∆∗∗ ≈
0.089(a − 1), the same as the limiting value in the case of national welfare maxi-
mization. (In this case, of course, the external externalities are also negligible.) If the
world market is very large relative to the home market (R→ 0), then the critical value
is ∆∗∗ ≈ 0.033(a−1), which is less than the corresponding value under the total surplus
criterion for national welfare maximization. This reflects that the sum of externalities
on agents in F and W is strictly positive in this range. More generally, it is shown in
the appendix that ∆∗∗ < ∆∗ holds for all finite values of R. Hence, there is a range
of cost reductions for which the merger increases global welfare, but is nevertheless re-
jected by a national government that maximizes total domestic surplus. In our model,
domestic merger policy will therefore be ‘too restrictive’ towards national mergers from
a perspective of global surplus maximization.
In the case where foreign firms have already merged, completely analogous results
obtain. In particular, the effects of a domestic merger on the producer surplus of the
foreign (merged) firm and on consumers in the world market have the same signs as
in eqs. (16) and (17), and the turning point for the sign of each externality is again
∆F = ∆W = (a− 1)/5. Our findings are summarized in
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Result 5: (Domestic vs. global welfare maximization.) A domestic merger that raises
total national surplus will also raise total surplus worldwide. For moderate cost reduc-
tions (∆ < (a − 1)/5) the gains to foreign producers exceed the losses to world con-
sumers; whereas for large cost reductions (∆ > (a−1)/5) the gains to world consumers
exceed the losses to foreign producers.
5 International mergers
A different scenario that can readily be addressed in our framework is a cross-country
merger, say between H’s firm 1 and F’s firm 1. In each of the markets H and F, the
merged firm is still part of a duopoly, but it may now have gained a cost advantage
over its domestic competitor. In the world market W, the merged firm acts as one com-
petitor, thus reducing the total number of firms in this market to three. In this section
we analyze the optimal policies towards such international mergers, and compare them
to the results derived above for the case of national mergers.
In the home market (and equivalently in market F), profit maximization by the merged
firm 1 (with unit cost of 1−∆I) and its competitor (with unit costs of 1) yields Cournot
duopoly outputs of xI1 = [a− 1+ 2∆I ]/(3b), respectively xI2 = [a− 1−∆I ]/(3b), where
the superscript ‘I’ stands for an international merger. The resulting market price is
pI = (a + 2 − ∆I)/3, showing that the cost savings by the merged firm are partly
passed on to consumers. Consumer surplus is
csI =
1
2b
(
2(a− 1) + ∆I
3
)2
. (19)
Comparing (19) to (2) shows immediately that an international merger can never hurt
consumers in either country H or F, even if ∆I = 0.
The producer surplus of the merged firm and the non-merged firm (subscript ‘N’) in
the home country are
psI =
1
b
(
a− 1 + 2∆I
3
)2
, psIN =
1
b
(
a− 1−∆I
3
)2
. (20)
In comparison to a national merger, which causes a domestic monopoly [cf. (8)], the
producer surplus of the merged firm (in both countries together) is now increased by
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less. In the world market, the effects of an international merger are the same as those
caused by a national merger, and the surplus of the merged firm and its competitors
in eqs. (9)–(10) is unchanged from our treatment in Section 3. Hence PSM = PSI
and PSMN = PS
I
N . Note, finally, that the surpluses of both the merged firm and the
non-merged firms are now divided equally between countries H and F.
5.1 Privately profitable international merger
The condition for the merger to be privately profitable is derived in the Appendix and
given by
∆I > ∆˜I ≡ (a− 1) 64R + 27
(128R + 81)
[√
(64R + 27)2 + 2.52(128R + 81)
(64R + 27)2
− 1
]
. (21)
As in the case of national mergers [eq. (12)], equation (21) determines the critical cost
reduction ∆˜I for varying levels of the relative market size parameter R. It is seen that,
in contrast to a national merger, an international merger can never be profitable in
the absence of cost savings (i.e., for ∆I = 0). This is because the merged firm will
have no gains in markets H and F in this case, relative to the pre-merger situation,
while its joint market share in country W falls. If the world market is of negligible size
(R → ∞), l’ Hoˆpital’s rule gives ∆˜I = 0. Not surprisingly, in the other extreme case
where only the world market matters (R → 0), the critical cost reduction is the same
as the limit value for a national merger, ∆˜I = (a − 1)(√1.28 − 1)/3 ≈ (a − 1)0.044.
Moreover, it is shown in the appendix that, for any positive level of R, condition (21)
is stricter than the corresponding condition for a national merger [eq. (12)].
Note that if a merger between a first pair of firms in countries H and F is profitable,
then the same is also true for a merger between the second pair of firms. The reasoning
is analogous to the one in the case of national mergers (Results 2 and 3). The difference
between the first and the second merger lies only in their effect on the world market,
and the change from three to two suppliers will lead to a larger price increase in this
market than the move from four to three suppliers. Hence, if the first international
merger takes place, so will the second.14
14In parallel with the analysis in Section 4, we here investigate ‘conditional’ international-merger
equilibria. Unconditional (endogenous) merger equilibria are the subject of Section 6.
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Result 6. (International merger.) A merger between one home firm and one foreign
firm increases the joint producer surplus if (21) holds. The required cost reduction
is always higher or equal than in the case of a national merger. If (21) holds, the
conditional merger equilibrium will feature two internationally merged firms.
5.2 Regional policies towards cross-country mergers
We now consider optimal policy towards international mergers. For the cross-country
merger considered here, it is natural to assume that merger control is in the hands of a
regional merger authority. This is in line, for example, with the division of competences
for merger control in the European Union. We assume that this regional regulator
maximizes the total joint surplus in countries H and F. However, due to the complete
symmetry of the model in the case of cross-country mergers, it is sufficient to evaluate
the total surplus in the home country. In addition to the surplus of the merged firm,
this measure includes the consumer surplus in the home market in (19) and the profits
of the non-merged home firm in (20). We have already established that consumers in
countries H and F will benefit from any international merger that is accompanied by
a positive cost reduction. The cost reduction needed to raise the home country’s total
surplus is (see the appendix)
∆I∗ = (a− 1) 64R + 9
176R + 99
[√
(64R + 9)2 − 3.96(176R + 99)
(64R + 9)2
− 1
]
. (22)
This expression equals zero, if the world market is of negligible size (R → ∞), and
it is negative when the world market is very large (R → 0). This shows that the
national government will accept any international merger that is proposed. The core
difference to the case of a national merger (Result 4) is that the merged firm will still
face a domestic competitor in the home market. In the absence of a world market, both
producers and consumers in the home country will just be indifferent towards a merger
that entails no cost reductions.15 Adding the world market to the picture, the home
15This corresponds to the benchmark result in Cournot models that the aggregate external effect of
a merger cannot be negative, if the merging firms have a market share of at most 50% (Levin, 1990).
For the international merger considered here, this market share is just 50% when ∆I = 0.
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Figure 3: International mergers with national or regional regulation
R =∞ R = 0
∆ = 0
∆ = 0.1(a− 1)
0.044(a− 1)
merger not proposed
merger proposed and permitted
country always gains from the merger, even in the absence of cost savings, because the
merger increases concentration and consumer prices in market W.
On account of symmetry, the effects of the international merger on the total surplus in
countries H and F taken together will just be twice the isolated effect on country H.
Therefore, the critical value derived in (22) is unchanged if joint surplus maximization
in the producing countries H and F is the policy objective. Figure 3 shows the parameter
combinations for which international mergers are proposed and cleared by the regional
merger authority. We summarize in
Result 7: (Optimal policy towards international merger.) An international merger
will never be blocked by a regulator that maximizes total joint surplus in H and F.
5.3 Global welfare
It remains to determine whether it is possible for an international merger to raise the
profits of the merging firms and total surplus in countries H and F, but nevertheless
reduce total surplus worldwide. This is not a trivial issue, given that we know from
our previous analysis that consumers in country W will be hurt by a merger that is
accompanied by only moderate cost reductions. The critical cost reduction required for
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the international merger to increase global welfare is (see the appendix)
∆I > ∆I∗∗ ≡ (a− 1) 128R + 45
(352R + 207)
[√
(128R + 45)2 + 3.24(352R + 207)
(128R + 45)2
− 1
]
. (23)
Evaluating this expression for R = 0 shows that ∆I∗∗
∣∣
R=0
≈ 0.033(a − 1). If the
world market is very large, the cost reduction that makes the merger profitable for the
involved firms will also ensure that the merger increases total surplus worldwide. In
the other extreme case where only the home market matters, ∆∗∗|R→∞ = 0, which is
the same threshold as for total national surplus to increase. More generally, it is shown
in the appendix that in our set-up ∆I∗∗ ≤ ∆˜I holds for any level of R. Hence we have
Result 8: (Global welfare effects of international merger.) Any international merger
that raises the producer surplus of the merged firms will also increase global surplus.
From a perspective of global surplus maximization, there is thus no need for either
national or regional control of international mergers in our model. The reason is that
an international merger does not create a monopoly in either the home or the foreign
market, and hence will be profitable for the merging firms only if cost reductions are
sufficiently high. This threshold is in turn sufficient to ensure that global world surplus
increases. Note, however, that some of the gains to the producing countries H and F
come at the expense of consumers in country W, whose surplus is still reduced by the
international merger as long as ∆I < ∆W = (a− 1)/5.
6 Endogenous merger equilibria
A recent development in the merger literature is that the firms’ choice between different
possible partners is endogenised. Horn and Persson (2001a, 2001b) treat mergers as a
cooperative game of coalition formation and show that an equilibrium market structure
maximizes the sum of industry profits, rather than just the profits of the merging
firms. This result is very intuitive: if total industry profits are not maximized under a
given ownership structure, then there will always be an incentive for at least one firm
(including those which have not merged) to make a merger offer to some other firm
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that leaves both of these firms better off.16
It is straightforward to apply this general approach to our simple model. As we have
argued above for both national and international mergers, any conditional merger equi-
librium will feature either no mergers at all, or two merged firms (Results 3 and 6).
Hence all that remains to be analyzed is under which conditions the equilibrium own-
ership structure is characterized by two national firms, two international firms, or no
mergers at all.17
If the cost savings associated with a national and an international merger is the same
(∆ = ∆I), then we already know (from Result 6) that firms will always prefer the
national mergers, as this will give them monopoly power in their respective home mar-
kets. However, as we have discussed in Section 4, these mergers may not be permitted
by national merger authorities. In such cases only international mergers are feasible
and this will also be the merger equilibrium, provided that cross-border mergers are
privately profitable.
Figure 4 summarizes the equilibrium merger structure for different parameter combi-
nations when national mergers are regulated by national merger authorities and cross-
country mergers are regulated by a regional merger authority. Higher cost savings are
associated with more national mergers in equilibrium, because firms always prefer na-
tional over international mergers, and (national) merger authorities will accept more
national mergers in this case. Similarly, a large relative size of the world market (R→ 0)
implies that most of the losses in consumer surplus occur in third countries, which again
16In general, only the sum of profits among the decisive owners matters for the equilibrium merger
structure (Horn and Persson, 2001b). In our model, however, the owners of all firms are decisive.
17In line with the relevant literature, we exclude the case of a worldwide monopoly. The latter
would obviously be in the interest of all firms, but it would also go against consumer interests in all
countries. Having excluded worldwide monopoly, there is in principle one more merger outcome to
consider. This is the ‘double-merger’ situation, where, say, the two country H firms and one of the F
firms merge. This outcome creates a monopoly in H, but only duopoly in F and W. We shall ignore
this outcome in the following, for two reasons: First, the four firms together will typically prefer the
outcome with two national mergers, as this allows deeper exploitation of cost reduction and monopoly
power. Second, merger authorities in country H are likely to be rather unsympathetic to the twin-
merger, as it implicitly leads to a loss of market share in W for H’s shareholders (they get to own 2/3
of the merged firm which has only around half of the world market).
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Figure 4: Equilibrium merger structure with national regulation
R =∞ R = 0
∆ = 0
∆ = 0.1(a− 1)
international merger
0.089(a− 1)
0.044(a− 1)
national merger
no merger
will induce national merger authorities to accept a larger share of national mergers.
In contrast, if the share of sales in world markets is low (R → ∞), and cost savings
are moderate, then the equilibrium market structure is characterized by cross-border
mergers. Finally, if the world market is relatively large and cost savings are close to
zero, then no mergers will occur in equilibrium.
The assumption that cost savings are identical for a national and a regional merger
is, however, a restrictive one. Reasons why international mergers may be associated
with higher cost savings include reduced aggregate transport costs (Horn and Persson,
2001a; Bjorvatn, 2004), higher synergies due to a more diverse knowledge base, or a
weakening of national trade unions as a result of international mergers (Lommerud,
Straume and Sørgard, 2005).
In our model, comparing total industry profits for national and international mergers
in the case where ∆ < ∆I involves only to compute total producer surplus in the home
market. The surplus in the foreign market will be symmetric, whereas the surplus in
the world market is the same under the two different types of duopoly. Subtracting the
producer surplus of the merged firm in the case of a national merger [eq. (8)] from the
sum of the two surplus measures for an international merger [eq. (20)] gives
psI + psIN − psM =
1
b
{
5
9
(∆I)2 +
2
9
∆I(a− 1)− (a− 1)
2
36
− ∆(a− 1)
2
− ∆
2
4
}
.
23
The critical value of ∆I for which the international merger causes higher total industry
profits, is then
∆I > ∆ˆI =
−2(a− 1) +√4(a− 1)2 + 5{(a− 1)2 + 9∆[∆ + 2(a− 1)]}
10
. (24)
Clearly, the minimum required cost savings that make the international mergers more
profitable (∆ˆI) are a rising function of the cost savings arising from a national merger.
In the special case where the latter does not cause any cost reduction (∆ = 0), interna-
tional mergers will be more profitable for the industry as a whole, if they lead to cost
savings of at least ∆ˆI = (a − 1)/10. If this condition is fulfilled, then the endogenous
equilibrium ownership structure will always be one with two internationally merged
firms. This is summarized in our last result:
Result 9: (Endogenous merger equilibrium.) If domestic and international mergers
lead to identical cost savings, then the equilibrium market structure is characterized by
international mergers, if cost savings are moderate and the share of sales in third mar-
kets is low. The equilibrium market structure will also be characterized by international
mergers, whenever condition (24) holds.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have set up a simple three-country model with segmented markets and
Cournot competition between firms. A home country and a foreign country both have
two domestic firms which supply the respective domestic markets plus a third (world)
market. Within this set-up we have formally analyzed the effects of national and cross-
border mergers on the firms involved, on selected groups of consumers, and on the
world as a whole. We argued that when national merger authorities pursue national
surplus, they tend to be overly restrictive vis-a-vis national mergers, so some proposed
national mergers will be rejected by authorities despite being beneficial from a world
perspective. In contrast, proposed international mergers will be efficiently cleared by
national and regional authorities. Finally, we considered endogenous merger formation
and demonstrated how the possible outcomes – no merger, twin-national merger, or
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twin-international merger – depend on both the extent of cost reduction accompanying
a merger and the size of the world market relative to the national markets.
Despite its simplicity, our model allows to derive a foundation for the empirical observa-
tion that mergers seem to come in waves. In particular, we found that whenever any two
of the four firms in our model decides to merge, either within a country or cross-border,
so will the remaining two firms. Further, a striking result of our analysis is the pro-
nounced difference between national and international mergers. This result captures,
in a stylized form, an important asymmetry between national and cross-border merg-
ers in markets where national players dominate. In these markets a national merger
will indeed reduce the number of firms that actively supply the market, whereas an
international merger will not. Our model shows that the conditions for an international
merger to be in the interest of the participating firms are unambiguously stricter than
in the case of a national merger, but when indeed proposed, international mergers
will not be vetoed by neither national nor regional merger authorities. This finding is
compatible with the permissive stance of merger control at the level of the European
Union: of almost 1600 merger proposals that the European Commission had to decide
upon until the end of 2000, more than 85 per cent were accepted immediately and only
13 mergers, or less than 1 per cent, were finally rejected (Schmidt, 2001, p. 237).
Lastly, our analysis does not lend support to the hypothesis that national or regional
merger policy is used as a beggar-thy-neighbour instrument. This is partly due to
the property of the Cournot oligopoly model that a merger will typically benefit the
firms that are not participating in it. There is another element in our model which is
responsible for this result, however. It is well known that the strategic effects of national
policies are strongest when all domestic output is sold in a third market. This setting
underlies, for example, the result of De Stefano and Rysman (2004) that countries will
always favour a single national champion, as this policy allows them to use strategic
trade policies most effectively. In contrast, in our model the output of the merged
firm is also consumed in the country that undertakes the regulation. This ensures that
mergers are not accepted unless they are associated with cost savings, which outweigh
the efficiency losses resulting from reduced competition at home.
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Appendix
A. National merger
Nationally optimal merger policy: We add (14) and (11) in the case where the
foreign firms have not merged. This implicitly defines ∆∗ by
Λ ≡ 3
2b
(
a− 1 + ∆
2
)2
+
1
B
(
a− 1 + 3∆
4
)2
− 4
b
(
a− 1
3
)2
− 2
B
(
a− 1
5
)2
= 0. (A.1)
Multiplying by B, introducing R = B/b and solving for ∆∗ yields (15).
To see that ∆∗ > ∆˜ for any level of R, note first from (A.1) that Λ(∆) ≡ Γ(∆)+Θ(∆)
is monotonically increasing in ∆. Moreover, Λ(∆˜) < 0 since Γ(∆˜) = 0 [eq. (11)] and
Θ(∆˜) < 0 [eq. (14)] . Hence we can unambiguously infer that ∆∗, which solves (A.1),
must exceed ∆˜.
Globally optimal merger policy: To determine the net externality caused by the
domestic merger, we have to add up Φ1 in (16) and Φ2 in (17). This yields
Φ ≡ 1
160B
[
25∆2 − 10∆(a− 1) + (a− 1)2] ≥ 0 (A.2)
which is positive for all values of ∆ 6= (a− 1)/5 and zero for ∆ = (a− 1)/5.
Adding up Λ in (A.1) and Φ in (A.2) gives a measure of the change in global total
surplus18 defined by
Ω ≡ ∆2
[
3
8b
+
23
32B
]
+∆(a− 1)
[
3
4b
+
5
16B
]
− (a− 1)2
[
5
72b
+
9
800B
]
, (A.3)
which is negative at ∆ = 0 and monotonically rising in ∆. The condition Ω = 0 implic-
itly determines the critical level of cost reductions, ∆∗∗ given in (18), which is positive
for any level of R. Since Λ(∆∗) = 0 and Φ(∆∗) ≥ 0, it follows that Ω(∆∗) ≥ 0, with
the inequality holding strictly when ∆∗ 6= (a − 1)/5. From the positive monotonicity
of Ω(∆) it then follows that ∆∗∗ ≤ ∆∗.
18Foreign consumer surplus is not included in this welfare measure, because it is unaffected by the
domestic merger.
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B. International merger
Profitability for merging firms: The change in producer surplus for the merging
firms is psI + PSI − ps− PS > 0. Using eqs. (2), (5), (9) and (20), this gives
ΓI ≡ (a− 1)2
[
1
B
(
1
32
− 1
25
)]
+∆I(a− 1)
[
4
9b
+
3
16B
]
+ (∆I)2
[
4
9b
+
9
32B
]
. (A.4)
Setting (A.4) equal to zero, multiplying by B, introducing R = B/b and solving for ∆I
gives (21).
To show that the critical cost reduction needed to benefit the merging firms [eq. (21)]
is always stricter (or equally strict) than the parallel condition for a national merger
[eq. (12)], we evaluate the net gain to the firms from an international merger, ΓI
in (A.4), at the critical level of cost reduction for the national merger (∆˜I) and show
that ΓI(∆˜I) ≤ 0. Substituting (12) into (A.4) and rearranging gives
ΓI (∆˜I) =
1
Rb
[−7(a− 1)2
800
+
(a− 1)2(4R + 3) ρ
288(4R + 9)2
]
,
ρ ≡ (512R2 + 48R)
(
1−
√
1 +
(63− 100R)(4R + 9)
225(4R + 3)2
)
+
(512R2 + 708R + 243)(63− 100R)(4R + 9)
225(4R + 3)2
For R = 0 it is easily confirmed that ΓI(∆˜I) = 0. Moreover, straightforward, but
tedious calculations show that dΓI(∆˜I)/dR < 0, establishing the result.19
Regionally optimal merger policy: The sum of all changes in domestic surplus is,
from (19) and (20)
ΛI = (∆I)2
[
11
18b
+
11
32B
]
+∆I (a− 1)
[
4
9b
+
1
16B
]
+
11(a− 1)2
800B
. (A.5)
Setting this equal to zero, introducing R = B/b and solving for ∆I gives (22).
Globally optimal merger policy: The sum of all welfare changes caused by the
international merger is (i) the change in total surpluses in H and F which, due to
19We have performed these calculations using Mathematica. The results are available from the
authors upon request.
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symmetry are two times the change given in (A.5); and (ii) the change in consumer
surplus for consumers in W, as given in (17). Thus
ΩI = (∆I)2
[
11
9b
+
23
32B
]
+∆I (a− 1)
[
8
9b
+
5
16B
]
− 9(a− 1)
2
800B
. (A.6)
This sum is negative at ∆I = 0 and monotonically rising in ∆I . Introducing R and
setting ΩI = 0 gives (23).
To prove that any international merger that raises the profits of the merged firm will
also raise world welfare, we have to show that ΩI in (A.6) is positive when evaluated
at ∆˜I . Substituting ∆˜I from (21) into (A.6) and rearranging gives
ΩI (∆˜I) =
(a− 1)2
Rb
[
(352R + 207)
288
(64R + 27)2
(128R + 81)2
(α2 − 2α + 1)
+
(128R + 45)
144
(64R + 27)
(128R + 81)
(α− 1)− 9
800
]
,
where α ≡
√
(128R + 54)2 + 10.08(128R + 81)
(128R + 54)2
.
Evaluating this with Mathematica shows that ΩI (∆˜I) > 0 holds for all finite levels of
R, with ΩI (∆˜I)→ 0 for R→∞.
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